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"LAw and social science" has been shouted by enthusiasts for a quarter
century with very little done about it. Legal education has suffered a
plethora of programs, first from the school of "sociological jurispru-
dence" and then from the school of "legal realism." Many of our
Benthamic expectations for social engineering through law have been mil-
lenarian. As in any area of living, great expectations are bound to create
moods of frustration or disillusion, of tired admission that the tried and
tested ways are best after all. What has been wanting has been someone
who would tackle the job of social science integration, not in fitful law
review articles or books, but in methodical and tangible material to be
used in teaching in a particular field. Only in that way could permanent
advance be made in training a new generation of students. Only in that
way could the ambitious programs of the legal realists be given demon-
strative substance. Professors Michael and Wechsler, in seven years'
joint work at Columbia, have developed such a tool for teaching, now
for the first time made available for general circulation as Criminal Law
and its Administration: Cases, Statutes and Commentaries. This Article
will attempt to review the reasons why an integration of law with the
other social sciences is important for legal education, to examine the
failure of the case-method to provide that integration, and to indicate
some of the exceptional contributions of Michael and Wechsler's work
to the future of legal education.
CASE-ANALYSIS, SOCIAL SCIENCE AND PROFESSIONAL TRAINING
The case-study of law is certainly not geared, nor should it be, to teach
the student what the law is, in the sense of general principles or minor
rules. Instead, cases are usually arranged to indicate the historical devel-
opment of legal doctrine, or to test the extent and application of principles
by borderline cases. The settled areas of law are not litigated, and the
study of cases teaches the content of the law only as a by-product of
teaching how to learn the law as needs arise in practice. Nonetheless, the
case-method is often utilized as an inefficient vehicle for imparting settled
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doctrine. Such teaching satisfies the poorer students and the poorer bar
examinations. But it compares to case study which is scientific rather
than dogmatic as memorizing of words and their declensions compares
with the general study of language. Brilliant social inventions, which
once pushed developments forward onto a new level, seem inevitably in
their old age to have a retarding influence. The inventions come to be
misused, or reverently modified in small particulars. This is as true of
the minor invention of Langdell as of the major methodological inno-
vations of Marx and Freud.
Much case-study is not devoid of import for social science. A well-
chosen selection of cases in any field can illustrate the social problem of
legal and judicial method. It can show how courts use words and how
legal doctrines are developed. As compared with text or office study,
the case system of teaching inculcates unusual semantic astuteness and
- in recent casebooks- awareness of the complexity of the common
law. The method has been criticized because the "facts" in an upper
court opinion are pre-digested and selected, so that the student does
not learn to marshal and relate events into the frame of legal controversy.
But as extended by the study of records, by "problem" cases, by moot court
work, by clinics and by legal aid, the case system can provide some ana-
lytical training. The results of that training are best exhibited by the
lawyer's eye for relevance - an eye (and in the good trial lawyer, an
ear) which comes to be almost instinctive. The lawyer can listen to his
client's story, pick out the factors relevant to the legal doctrines he knows,
and bring them out by questioning, just as a good diagnostician finds
out what is wrong with his patient in large part by good history-taking.
Anybody who has listened, without interrupting, to clients' stories or
patients' histories knows that the average layman's instinct for relevance
is feeble. That may be not for lack of training but for lack of mind;
I wish to avoid here the psychological controversy of whether there is
such a thing as mind-training. The study of law, if it does not develop,
does attract the analytical mind, grades it highly, gives it law review
advantages and a head start. Analogous to analytical training is the
dialectical skill developed by repeated dissection of cases, distinguishing
them, arguing with them. This skill is useful to advocates, whether in
courts, legislatures, or directors' meetings. With it goes an articulateness,
and an ability to bluff -skills fostered by class discussions and by ex-
aminations; both with obvious utility for the lawyer. But study of the
judicial process aims chiefly at giving the student an informed and sensi-
tive ability to predict what courts will do. Or rather, an ability to predict
what they won't do and to estimate the probabilities of their choice among
the limited alternatives. Success in business involves similar predictive
vision of what competitors and customers may do; politicians' stock-in-
trade is artful guessing about voters' choices. This predictive skill, the
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ability to persuade courts to follow one course rather than another, and
the eye for relevance, are gifts of no mean sort.
Today these gifts are not enough for the law student about to enter
practice. The lawyer is likely to need more social science than is afforded
by case-study of how courts behave. At the time the case system was
invented, the lawyer did not need more, or, if he did, more was not
available. Moreover, in 1890 a college-educated lawyer did not possess
a mental horizon vastly different from that of all but a handful of thinkers.
In a more stable world, values were less questioned, and the lawyer, if
he did not truly understand his world, thought that he did, and could
rule his life according to a syncretistic, consistent, usually ethical, pattern.
The triumphs of deflationary understanding of Sumner, Max Weber,
Veblen, Marx, Brooks Adams,. Freud had not yet burst open the old
values, and were not to unsettle the average American until the World
War of 1914 or the depression of 1929. Nor did the scientific elabora-
tion of these insights and methodologies -permitting the construction
of a revised scheme of values and understanding on a more complex and
sophisticated level-get going with its present momentum until recent
years. Even an expanded case system, which delves facts from trial
records and from Brandeis briefs (both litigious rather than evaluative),
and which provides a limited clinical experience in legal aid work, cannot
give the student adequate orientation on this level. For neither facts nor
experience have meaning without interpretation; and the interpretations
worked out by social scientists, though usually controversial and often
rudimentary, have become too ramified and systematic to be picked up
without explicit study. By the same token, neither chance conditioning
nor the smattering of argumentative information which filters through
cases or case-records can be relied on to prepare lawyers for their life
and work.
Today, the lawyer is counsel to large power-units in society: to
government, business, labor, farm cooperatives. As such, he is called
upon to organize social forces- in other words, to plan. No course of
law studies which deals with cases alone can possibly train lawyers for
planning, or for the draftsmanship which is both its symbol and its
technique. The student has bent his efforts to constructing legal rules out
of case-book cases by inductive reasoning. That is essentially an analytical
job. He has used his imagination in extrapolating cases to cover hypo-
thetical situations suggested by his teachers, but he has seldom invented
such situations. The draftsman's job, on the other hand, is imaginative
and synthetic. He must envisage the controversies of the future, and
organize opposed social forces into harmony for the resolution of these
controversies. In this kind of prediction, courts are only one of a con-
geries of institutions, and the case system gives knowledge only of upper
courts. The case system's feeling for words is semantic, but the drafts-
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man needs another feeling, creative as well as critical. Planning the future
with words, he must compromise divergences with them; he must educate
or manipulate congresses and courts and publics.
The social sciences which the lawyer should study for this kind of
work are not simply informational; they are also normative. It might
be thought that the lawyer need only be told the sort of future his clients
desire, and that he can then plan it for them if given the proper tools
as part of his professional social science training. If this were true, the
lawyer could do without making up his mind about social issues and
values. But he cannot. He is called upon constantly, whether he be judge,
legislator, or practicing lawyer, to make "policy" judgments. Clients,
business or government, don't know what kind of a future they want.
They want, partly, what they should have, and turn to their counsel for
guidance as men once turned to the clergy. But training in the making
of value judgments is not simply useful for lawyers in becoming bigger
success boys. The agreed aim of legal education is to turn students into
better citizens and community leaders. Even as technicians, the means
they use to carry out their clients' policies shape the ends which are
achieved. In human affairs, there are no machine tools. The lawyer as
technician plays a part in bringing about the future even when he may
not wish to, even when he may be unconscious of his role. The historical
study of cases can check pharasaical complacence over the present state
of the law, and the analytical study can indicate the values which are
now immanent in the cases themselves. But a course of studies which
is to be responsible for future values must take a transcendental attitude
towards past and present expositions of the law.
The difficulties of forecasting what training will be helpful to students
five, ten, twenty, thirty years hence are obvious enough. Yet the diffi-
culties are no excuse for not making the inquiry. The inquiry involves
much the same kind of investigation that went into Alfred WlVeber's path-
breaking essay on the location of industry. What law school graduates
are actually doing at present should be surveyed, not guessed at, as some
indication of what law school graduates may be doing in the future.
What they are doing and will be doing, of course, is in part a function
of the training they get, though also a function of the opportunities and
peculiarities of each locality. Professions do die. New professions arise
and belatedly win academic recognition in the form of "schools." Unless
the law schools trust in a laissez-faire which is discredited in other areas,
they should survey the future's need for special types of trained lawyers
to the extent that this can be foreseen. It might have been foretold some
years ago, for example, that lawyers would be needed to act as counsel
for housing authorities, and as members of housing administrations. A
particular school might set itself the task of building a program that
would fit men for that job and for related jobs. Its courses in real
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property and mortgages would be oriented towards the history and present
and future extent of the legal control of land use. They would teach the
relation between mortgage and conveyance law and land speculation, and
the relation of speculation to rural erosion and urban blight. Landlord
and tenant law, waste and nuisance and lateral support law, perpetuities
and restraints on alienation - these doctrines would be related to the
way men live and to current efforts-at reform. Zoning, eminent domain,
valuation, municipal corporations, taxation (including schemes of dif-
ferential taxation), tort liability of public bodies, civil service law -
all would appear where relevant to housing. The law school would call
on the resources of the attached university for architects and city planners,
for authorities on case-work and urban sociology. Articulate practitioners
and experts in land assembly, real estate management and tenant selection
would come in for consultation. The administrative law course might
use problems of a housing administration as illustrative material, rather
than those of the ICC. Students would, in some degree, come to the school
because this program appealed to them, rather than because of tradition
or similar irrelevant lure. The community would have a body of trained
men who are now wanting. Another school in an agricultural region,
attached to a university possessed of a good school of agriculture, might
fill a crying need by training lawyers to act as counsel for farm cooper-
atives or for processors. Such schools and such courses would not only
mean that new and important subjects would be explored, but also, neces-
sarily, that new training would be given. Without surveys, our common
sense tells us that method-training rather than subject-training will have
more useful residue later on. Without surveys, we know that the future
will probably see an increase of social controls, of "planning," and that
in the American tradition, lawyers are likely to be called on to do the work.
Rather than seek to salvage a declining profession by rear-guard attacks
on trust companies, unauthorized practice of the law, and administrative
agencies, schools can help to develop new fields for their graduates, as
well as to expand existing fields to serve larger sections of the population.
Only in that way will law schools continue to attract their present bulky
share of able and alert young men and women who are seeking a con-
structive professional career.
Despite this variety of present and future functions performed by law
school graduates, matched no doubt by a variety of faculty personnel
and of student background and desires, most law schools aspire to be
isomorphic. Schools which draw men from all over the country often
aim to be all things to all men, rather than to specialize on turning out
qualified men for unusual types of counsel-work. And what holds for
schools holds as clearly for courses within schools. Not all courses have
to be courses in draftsmanship or planning. But certainly three years
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are not required to teach judicial method through the study of upper
court cases. Like the division of labor which should take place among
schools, the division of labor among courses is a question of balancing
personnel, library resources, community needs.
Theoretically, almost any course could serve as a vehicle for training
lawyers in methods for present and future needs. But, for the initial
experiment, criminal law has advantages (beside the absence of pressure
for laying out the law) of which the classbook of Michael and Wechsler
makes most striking use. In the first place, social science data, though
inadequate, are more extensive here than in most other fields bounded
by the course-concept. The "crime problem" has called forth a wealth
of literature, of surveys, of journalism.' Some law students will have
had courses in criminology, or will have dealt with it in survey courses
in urban sociology. In the second place, criminal law is the law about
which laymen mostly talk, and about which law students and their friends
and families have vehement opinions, interest and, occasionally, first-hand
experience. In the third place, criminal law raises the ultimate problems
of social control more starkly, more inevitably, than do other subjects.
It is obvious there that social pressures come to focus in administrative
action by officials, and that bearing on the criminal law are ethics, poli-
tics, criminology, social science methodology, economics, and psychology.
Similar pressures and problems are hidden in the interstices of all the
substantive law courses. But capital punishment, the third degree, entrap-
ment, the right to shoot fleeing felons - these, and a host of problems
like them, must necessarily rouse controversy by their very statement.
Finally, as a first year course, criminal law offers an opportunity to orient
students at once in constitutional law, statutory interpretation, adminis-
trative law, labor and civil liberties problems. Postponement of these
matters runs the risk of allowing common-law habits of thought to be-
come irremovably fixed, weighted as they are with all the respectability
of tradition and the skill of long-experienced teachers.
Members of the bar, as prominent citizens, have a responsibility for the
"crime problem." The public's derogation of lawyers because of general
mishandling of crime gives the bar special incentives towards improve-
ment of criminal administration. Lawyers can assume a central position
as public officials, as voluntary defenders, as vigilant and informed critics
and reformers of criminal law, procedure, and administration, and as
professional protectors of civil liberties.
1. A periodical, The Journal of Criminal Law and Ciminology, is devoted to it
exclusively, as are many European reviews, while there are no law journals devoted to
contracts or torts, sales or agency-let alone to the social implications of these subjects.
See the thoughtful article by Professor Cavers, Neuz, Fields for the Legal Periodical
(1936) 23 VA. L. REv. 1.
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THE ORGANIZATION OF COURSES AND CURRICULA
It is training for this professional position, as well as orientation in
the methodology of social control, that Michael and Wechsler's volume
seeks to give. The book is divided into four parts. The first part is an
introduction which outlines the contents and methods of the course, and
broaches the basic philosophical problems of the criminal law. The second
part is The Prevention of Socially Undesirable Behavior; the third, The
Problem of Criminal Responsibility; the fourth, The Problem of Con-
flicting Values. These titles alone reveal a profound difference from
orthodox casebooks, which arrange their cases in legal rather than social
categories: offer and acceptance, presentation, last clear chance, or, in
the criminal field, first by crimes: murder, larceny, rape, etc., and then
by defenses: insanity, compulsion, mistake of fact, etc. Since Michael
and Wechsler's part on The Prevention of Socially Undesirable Behavior
contains the materials on the various crimes, and the part on The Prob-
lent of Criminal Responsibility contains materials on the various defenses,
it may be asked what difference the label makes. There has been a good
bit of ridicule of the now so popular renaming of courses: turning agency
and corporations into "Business Organizations," and sales and bills and
notes into "Contracts II." Moreover, any given material can logically
or analogically be organized according to various schemes of equal in-
clusiveness, and any scheme struggles vainly against the necessity for
understanding all of the material before any of it can be fully compre-
hended. And a teacher can pattern his own course differently from the
consecutive plan suggested by the editor. Nonetheless, the label does
make a difference, as any advertiser knows. The headings in a casebook
are often the teacher's or student's only clue as to how the compiler
viewed his field. It indicates which problems he deems to be central, and
which peripheral. Whether we go all the way with Kant or not, the
categories in which we view "reality" are obviously of vital importance.
The categories "economics," "political science," "psychology," have lim-
ited, as well as directed, our thinking about social problems. A division
of a criminal law course into categories of "larceny," "arson," and "in-
sanity" will tend to engender one kind of attitude, and "prevention of
socially undesirable behavior" and "the problem of conflicting values"
another, preferable, point of view.
The problem of the organization of the body of law and related ma-
terials within a school curriculum is essentially no different from the
problem of its organization within a course. If anything, the propa-
gandistic need for a socially significant plan of organization is greater
for the curriculum as a whole, since the area to be correlated is enormous
and since the division into "courses" taught by different men imposes
an initial obstacle. Students fail to relate their common-law courses
despite the similarity of methods and materials. In crimes and torts, for
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example, in the face of the obvious overlapping of the objectives of what
is called criminal law and what is called tort law, a coherent view of
controls of deviant behavior through law is seldom achieved.2
Professors Michael and Wechsler do not feel themselves bound by
prevailing curricular morphology. They follow the trail of their specialty,
criminal law administration, whether or not it leads into the domains
of other courses. From the course in personal property, they take what
they need to present the history of larceny, making use of Jerome Hall's
pioneering Theft, Law and Society. From the domain of legislation,
they borrow cases like McBoyle v. United States3 to indicate problems
of construction. They treat the constitutional and legislative issue of
uncertainty in statutory definition (the Cohen Grocery case,' the Nash
case,5 etc.) along with the debate over the creation of common lawsv crimes,
and with cross-reference to the extensive case material on conspiracy;
a Hague Court case coming up from Danzig indicates the Nazi approach
to the same problem. These questions lead on into the most complete
collection yet made of civil liberty materials, comprising in addition to
the leading Supreme Court decisions relevant matters which are not "con-
stitutional law": criminal libel, civil rights laws (including the important
Powe v. United States6), wire tapping, the third degree, and vigilantism.
Adjective law appears as it bears on specific substantive issues: burden
of proof appears in connection with the burden of showing justification
for homicide, and again in connection with the insanity defense; pre-
sumptions turn up in connection with receiving stolen goods and "dis-
orderly conduct" laws; testimonial issues are raised by hypothetical ques-
tions to insanity experts.
The usual curricular divisions have left obvious lacunae. Just as many
casebook-makers have sought to fill gaps by a simple process of addition:
adding statutes, or "fact" material, or footnote citations to other cases
and to law journals; so the curriculum-makers have added subjects to the
curriculum: writing courses to teach research and organization of ma-
terial; courses in labor law, corporate reorganization, government control
of business to bring in economic materials and relate law to public policy;
2. Even where the same concepts are employed, such as negligence or intent, students
fail to draw either parallels or discriminations. Torts negligence is 'Ar. A's "negligence,"
Monday, Wednesday and Friday, at 2:00; crimes is Mir. B's "negligence," Tuesday and
Thursday at 9:00. Personal experience in teaching both crimes and personal property
to first year men demonstrates that the use of different books, different hours, and different
names for the hours overbalances efforts to deal with the concepts of possession and
property as a whole, running through theft as well as many of the problems in personal
property.
3. 283 U. S. 25 (1931).
4. United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U. S. 81 (1921).
5. Nash v. United States, 229 U. S. 373 (1913).
6. 109 F. (2d) 147 (C. C.A. 5th, 1940).
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courses in administrative law (where they are not concentrated on dele-
gation and judicial review) to examine the problems and procedures of
administrative agencies; courses in comparative law (where they are
not surveys of continental systems) to broaden the critical base for
understanding a segment of American law; courses in legislation to
rub students' noses in statutes, and perhaps deal with drafting on a
modest scale (though many legislation casebooks simply deal with the
judicial process as it controls the legislative process or interprets
statutes) ; courses in legal history to trace the development of earlier
legal doctrines; courses in jurisprudence (where they are not taxonomic
studies of what has been thought and said) to raise permanent ethical
and epistemological issues in the law. Neither in casebooks nor curricula
is there any systematic attempt to relate law and social science as a whole.
All law is public law. The more "private" it seems, the more difficult,
and therefore the more necessary, to display its public implications in
the classroom. All law worth teaching involves legislative problems, which
can be illumined by comparative examples and by economic, political,
or psychological analysis. To label a series of elective courses as "com-
parative law," "legislation," "jurisprudence," etc., persuades students and
faculty that these essential approaches to all law are remote, "cultural,"
frilly dressings to the main dish of cases.
The consequent hostility to comparative and legislative materials pro-
longs the parochialism of the common law. By limiting legal studies to
a particular type of institution, it keeps those studies from having any
universal quality. Mere description or classification is not science. The
failure to generalize is perhaps the most important factor preventing
law from assuming its full status as a social science, in addition to its
special, non-generalized status as systematic, sovereign definition. This
failure gives a truncated answer to the critical question: what is law?
It confines law to the study of the past or predicted conduct of officials
who are judges or jurymen within a particular jurisdiction, rather than
making it include the regularized conduct of officials everywhere, no
matter what they are called. In the second place, common law paro-
chialism tends toward a positivistic definition of and attitude towards
law. If law is considered to be merely what goes in a particular jurisdic-
tion or system of jurisdictions, critical and even normative slants im-
plicit in comparative studies are likely to be excluded. To be sure, the
presence of some fifty American jurisdictions minimizes the evil and
curbs the ever-present tendencies towards Blackstonian rationalism and
smugness. But these systems spring from a common source, and by
failure to compare (at least within the culturally relevant and linguisti-
cally feasible limits of Western civilization) we unnecessarily confine
the available alternatives for the law's adjustment of pressing social
problems.
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CRIIINAL LAW AND ADMINISTRATION AS A SOCIAL SCIENCE
Michael and Wechsler make law a social science by being steadily
comparative, legislative, and jurisprudential---drawing upon the resources
of the other social sciences to explain comparisons, assist legislation,
and give content to jurisprudence. Where other compilers use illustrative
cases, Michael and vVechsler incline to the use of illustrative statutes;
reports preparatory or supplementary to legislation, such as the Criminal
Law Commissioners' Reports and Macauley's Notes on the Indian Code,
are extensively excerpted and cited. Robbery, arson, burglary are pre-
sented by selected statutes, with cases as annotations. The procedural
distinctions between larceny, embezzlement, and false pretenses are dealt
with as a problem in statutory consolidation, exemplified by the New
York, English, Massachusetts, and California statutes, with several lead-
ing cases indicating the techniques and problems of interpretation. Even
the common-law rules as to homicide are illumined in part through
American declaratory statutes or through the codifications of the Cyprus
and British Indian codes. Italian and Soviet homicide statutes are in-
cluded for comparison.7 Thus comparative law is not taught simply by
juxtaposition, but is made an integral part of the entire book.
The authors have drawn upon collaborators from other social sciences
wherever possible. Such collaboration is essential for any far-reaching
researches which cross the railroad tracks separating law from the other
social sciences. Collaboration need not necessarily be personal; where
the relevant studies have been published, they can be read. Michael and
Wechsler have ransacked the literature with exceptional thoroughness and
imagination. A glance at the 24-page table of articles, books, and other
publications shows the inclusion of such recondite sources as Catherine
II's instructions to Commissioners Appointed to Frame a New Russian
Code; of such fugacious pieces as articles in The Nation or in various
trade journals, and newspaper accounts of criminal trials and vigilante
activities; of the seldom-cited but valuable reports of a century of efforts
by reforming and investigatory bodies. By this unremitting attention
to efforts at law reform, past and present, they give their book a sense
of social movement, even hopefulness, lacking in casebooks whose sense
of progress is confined to the decided cases. They reprint the writings
of alienists like Singer and Zilboorg as well as those of Stephen and
7. The Italian penal code was chosen for comparison, here and elsewhere, rather
than French or German codes, because it is the product of the "advanced" Italian crim-
inological movement. Like the Soviet code, though less self-consciously, it marches under
the banner of "measures of social defense" rather than the more traditional slogans
common to the United States and the countries of Western Europe. Comments relating
the Italian code to the Anglo-American materials, particularly useful in the tricky fields
of attempts, conspiracy, and mistake, were written for inclusion in the volume by
Professor Nino Levi, formerly of the University of Genoa.
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Ferri for their bearing on insanity and feeblemindedness; psychoanalytic
literature has influenced the authors' approach to questions of deterrence
and motivation. In dealing with juveniles, they set forth, in addition to
legislation in New York, Italy, and Russia, and several leading cases,
the Youth Correction and Youth Correction Authority Acts of the Ameri-
can Law Institute and Professor Waite's comments thereon, extracts
from The Forgotten Adolescent, and Michael's extended book review
of the Gluecks' One Thousand Juvenile Delinquents.
But reading the literature is not enough where it is sought to get at
unrecorded practice - unrecorded because unapproved, or recent, or
taken for granted. Here, personal contacts have been made. The authors
or their assistants have talked with policemen and fire marshals, with
insurance officials and grandjurymen, with parole officers and district
attorneys, with victims of theft and with reformers. In the field of theft,
for example, the classbook indicates the crucial importance of fences;
the use of the criminal law as a club to force civil recoveries, especially
in embezzlement cases, and the administrative difficulties of law enforce-
ment where restitution has been made; the dubious roles of insurance
companies and "no questions asked" advertisements in condoning theft.
In reprinting such materials, Michael and Wechsler are not simply
eclectic. Prevailing theories of liability are related to the authors' own
analysis of the ways in which the criminal law can and should operate,
that is, to the question of what behavior it is possible and desirable to
deter. Nor do they include criminological data merely because interesting;
where, for example, they reprint three case histories of thieves, they do
not leave to chance the interpretation of these probation officers' reports.
They write:
"Whatever the significance of statutory penalty variation in mark-
ing extreme limits, the heart of the sentence process is the exercise
of judicial and administrative discretion. This is especially true in
dealing with non-violent theft where statutory minima are rare, the
injury often reparable, the crime not commonly terrifying and the
demand for severity frequently subdued. To picture the working
of discretion with precision and detail is necessarily a task for special
investigation. The following case reports do no more than illustrate
typical problems of the sentencing judge and suggest the type of
assistance that may be obtained from competent pre-sentence in-
vestigation." s
Thus, legislative, comparative, and sociological materials are organized
insistently around the central questions of legal and social policy: how
does one decide what behavior is socially undesirable; what sorts of
behavior should be made criminal; and what should be done with per-
8. P.569.
[Vol. 50: 636646
LAW AND SOCIAL SCIENCE
sons who engage in criminal behavior, or in behavior which is indicative
of dangerousness? In demanding answers to these questions, Professors
Michael and Vechsler do not view the criminal law anthropologically,
as do the emancipated realists - as a question of folkways. They believe
in evil, which is a necessary condition for achieving good. The question
of what is good is raised at the outset, in presenting the argument between
positivists and retributionists; and the authors never let the student
forget that civil liberty problems are inherent in all criminal law admin-
istration. The folkways are to be studied, in addition to ethical theory
-ancient; medieval, and modern - for suggesting, though not control-
ling, what is good; and for indicating the limits of effective legal action
in the achievement of any particular goal.
The first goal discussed in the book is the prevention of homicide, the
undesirability of which is not open to serious question. The extended
discussion of homicide focuses around two related problems: legislative
individualization and administrative individualization. The distinctions
between the degrees of murder and manslaughter, the problems of inten-
tion and negligence, of the felony-murder and misdemeanor-manslaughter
rules - these are viewed from the standpoint of the critic of present
and the draftsman of future penal codes. These legislative problems are
considered with deterrence and reformation as the objectives of treat-
ment, and nullification and administrative convenience as limitations.
Whereas case-by-case treatment fosters the pigeonholing of decisions,
a process aided for lawyers by the careful but unimaginative indexing
of their paid retainers, Shepard's, Corpus Juris, etc., the legislative
approach broadens the range of analogy and the choice of alternative
policies. The labels: murder, manslaughter, non-criminal homicide, are
subordinated to comparisons, in terms of social undesirability and the
limits of effective legal action, between, for instance, the intentional killer
who unreasonably believes he is justified in self-defense; the negligent
killer; the killer who makes a mistake of law.
The problem of administrative individualization within the limits per-
mitted by legislation is especially pointed up by the homicide field because
of the discontinuous gradation between capital punishment and imprison-
ment, even for life. The authors give English and American figures on
the actual use of the death penalty, and quote prison officials on the
deteriorating effect of long (over ten years) prison terms. The famous
Romilly-Paley debate (1810) over rule versus discretion in capital punish-
ment is reprinted, as are excerpts from the report and minutes of evidence
of the Select Committee on Capital Punishment (1930). The authors,
here as elsewhere, include textual comments of their own, many of them
taken or developed from their article, "A Rationale of the Law of Homi-
cide." 9 Executive clemency, judicial discretion, jury discretion (statu-
9. (1937) 37 Cor. L R v. 701, 1261.
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tory) and jury nullification, and sentencing boards, are dealt with as
agencies of mitigation, extant or possible. The offered materials include,
for example, messages of the Governor of New York in pardon or
commutation cases, the few court opinions on sentence, and statistics on
probation or suspended sentence. The problem of sentencing is kept in
the foreground not only by these separate materials devoted to it but
by footnotes to the cases in other sections, calling attention to the penalty
imposed and its relation to the maxima and minima provided by statute.
But the administrative problem - what should be done in a particular
case--is always subordinated to the legislative problem- what is the
design of a just and administratively workable penal code?
THE RISKS AND REWARDS OF SOCIAL SCIENCE STUDY FOR LAWYERS
There is no denying that these problems are difficult to teach. The
usual case-course either tests the extent of substantive law principles
by borderline cases, or presents the historical development of the prin-
ciples by a series of cases chronologically arranged. Class discussion runs
usually to "stating the case," discussing the soundness of its reasoning
within the doctrinal framework of the other cases, and distinguishing
cases which resemble the stated case. Sometimes there is debate as to
the merits of a "majority" or "minority" point of view, usually revolv-
ing around the two "leading" but opposed cases which follow each other
in the casebook, each trailing its footnote citing the other decisions in
accord. This debate is the form of exercise students are provided for
developing their sense of justice and their sense for social problems.
The usual hypothetical case question: should the conviction of defendant
be affirmed or reversed on appeal, is simpler by far than the problem
questions which Michael and Wechsler append to each section in the
book, or utilize in the course examinations at Columbia. Take for ex-
ample the questions following the materials on violation of property
rights accompanied by danger to the person:
"(1) What is the nature of the evil or evils threatened by the
various kinds of behavior comprehended within the categories of
robbery, extortion and criminal coercion?
(2) What significance should be accorded to the following factors
in distinguishing criminal from non-criminal coercion:
a. The nature of the injury with which the victim is threatened?
b. The immediacy of the injury?
c. The nature of the act demanded as the price of avoiding the
injury?
d. If the person who will be injured and the person to whom the
threat is directed are not the same, their relationship, if
any?
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e. The ends which the person making the threat seeks to achieve?
f. The means employed to express the threat?
To what extent are these considerations legally material (a) in
New York and (b) in England?
(3) Viewing the New York robbery, extortion and related statu-
tory provisions as a unit:
a. To what extent do the various sections overlap?
b. What treatment discriminations do they make?
c. To what extent are the treatment discriminations justifiable or
unjustifiable?
To what extent are they significant?
(4) Is the statistical data with respect.to the treatment of persons
convicted of robbery in New York of any value (a) in evaluating
the statutory provisions or (b) in guiding administrative policy? If
so, in what respects?
(5) In what respects do the English and New York statutes dif-
fer? Which is preferable ?" '
How can students be taught to answer questions like these? Some
will fail. With others, the problem is, in part, one of making statutes
teachable. The case method continues to hold sway partly because cases,
though seldom "literature," make easy reading. They are discursive, con-
crete, and, especially in criminal law, dramatic." Statutes are abstract,
unliterary. They require imaginative and creative spelling out, not routine
condensation. A statute cannot be skimmed, and does not appeal to most
students, who become rigid common-law lawyers on the day they enter
law school, sharing with their elders at the bar an unwarranted admira-
tion for judges as compared with legislators and administrators. Michael
and WVechsler have no panacea for this problem. Their homicide statutes
are gathered in an appendix, and appendices, like footnotes, are "skipped."
New York students will read New York statutes because that is their
"law," but balk at Massachusetts or California, and ignore India or
Italy. In other words, they will study cases comparatively but not statutes.
This comparative law method is fashionable for cases, for it has behind
it the prestige of the big Eastern "national" schools where most case-
books are manufactured. Moreover, you can sometimes cite an Indiana
case as currency before a New York court, but not an Indiana statute.
Statutes, however, reveal patterns: they can be compared as cases can
for imitation (precedent) and innovation. The English criminal law
commissioners made use of Livingstone's code, and Italian statutes have
10. P. 400.
11. The very practice of abstracting shows how much padding the usual case con-
tains. (Abstracted cases make up the bulk of case material in the Michael and Wechsler
collection, although many of the leading decisions are reprinted in full).
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influenced American criminologists. But students habitually think of
themselves as advocates-to-be, and not as participants in the legislative
process, much less as persons whose views on legislative issues, on public
policy, have any importance.
Clearly, however, a class using Michael and Wechsler's book have no
reason to resort to case-stating and case-argument of the usual sort.
Nor is there any point in searching out and comparing other cases, other
text-book theories; the book itself is a reference work, and covers more
ground than can possibly be handled in class in a year's two-hour course.
Nor will it be profitable simply to ask questions about the material, as
it is not possible to add much to the problem questions in the book.
As the classbook is recent, the assumed need to keep the students up
to date with the advance sheets will not appear for a year or so. How
is the hour best to be spent, then? Only in discussion. Discussion on
the basis of the concrete descriptive and questioning materials common
to teacher and class. Discussion and criticism of the hierarchy of values
which Michael and Wechsler set forth at the outset and assume as a
frame of reference throughout. Undeniably, many of the student's first
thoughts about public policy and ethics will be banal and unsophisti-
cated. So are the first critical and creative thoughts of anyone. The
teacher must take the student seriously as he fumbles and explores, and
must also compel his classmates to do so. Otherwise, the student will
not take himself seriously. He must be made to feel that what he has
to say about social policy has weight, and will have weight. It is clear,
moreover, that the relation of the book's stimulating scholarship to its
pedagogic utility is not very different from the relation of research to
teaching in the work of an individual professor. Professors actively
engaged in research can acquaint students with how knowledge is gained,
how scholars' judgments are formed- aiding the students to discover
criteria for their own judgment, on the intellectual side, and showing
them what responsible scholarship signifies in the way of investigation
and decision, on the moral side. Thus, by example and experience in
class, the student can gradually develop the habit of independent thinking
about policy and learn to have confidence in his critical and integrated
judgments about values. These are the habits essential for Democracy.
But these are not the habits which law students develop today, on the
basis of case-training. Some first-year instructors, desirous of turning
out hard-boiled professionals, indicate that debates about values and about
law reform are "college stuff," and frown on the expression of lay ethical
views. Where this teaching takes hold, it tends to turn out cynical rela-
tivists. Other teachers try to do more than study the judicial method
"realistically." They try to raise social issues under one of the current
slogans, such as "balancing the interests," "competing social policies," or
"reasonableness." But many casebook cases are only fossils to remind
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us of departed vitality: "There are laws which are like old houses: they
endure and stand upright but no one lives in then anymore." It is
inevitable that, where the social problems dealt with in the cases are dead
or insignificant, students will be driven again to a cynical conclusion:
it doesn't matter how a case is decided: there are always cases either
way; pay your money and take your choice. But even where the prob-
lems are obviously real and pressing, and even where the traditional
over-valuation of common-law wisdom does not stultify criticism, class
debate about what is "reasonable" and how the interests should be bal-
anced turns into a bull session. Information and philosophy are lacking
on which sophisticated discussion could proceed. Discussion is, there-
fore, ended at a question-begging phrase about "competing social policies"
at the very point where it should properly begin. Consequently, many
students tend to develop the opinion that the lawyer does not balance
the interests; he merely reflects them. Lawyers are on the mechanical
fringe of policy-determination. The law is thought to follow, rather than
reflect, the progressive insights of science or the drives of class. The
law is like a chaperone at a gay party who is shocked and turns her back
on the goings-on but eventually, though covertly, approves them. The
lawyer so chaperoned will not study social science -it is strange and
different and too difficult. Law is easy, but even there you need a course
for every subject on the bar exam. How, then, can you aspire to cope
with marginal utility economics or the determination of probable error
in statistics or the classification of symbol data in social psychology?
Those higher domains where the important truths are examined and
revealed are outside the province of a mere legal technician. Thus law,
which is the keystone of the arch of public policy, is robbed of vitality
and significance. Partly, this is the human foible of seeing the green
pastures elsewhere, but partly it is the consequence of pedagogic failure
which for three years drowns imagination in technique.
There are, of course, a few schools and a number of law teachers who
have made an effort to look over departmental walls. We talk in torts
about the distribution of economic risks, in trusts about the economic
effect of limiting investment to "legals," in constitutional law about "the
national market" or the beatitude of minimum wage laws. But these
superficial doses are as dangerous as the proverbial short drink. Able
law students are apt to emerge from this training with an alarming
confidence in their ability to master any social science. They are jacks
of all trades. They evince a genuine scorn for social science, feeling
there is nothing they cannot learn in six weeks' time by talking to the
experts and reading a few books. Their exceptional case-trained sophis-
tication about the meaning of meaning leads them not only to contempt
for social scientists whose use of words is less self-conscious but also
to a habit of underrating ideas which are not authoritatively defined.
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That this pervasive contempt may in large part be justified is immaterial.
It is equally immaterial that a crop of young lawyers may be so able
and industrious as to overcome remarkably their handicaps in training.
The point is that training, which produces such attitudes, diminishes to
some extent the potential ability of these lawyers to work understand-
ingly and critically with what good people and materials there are in the
social science fields. Moreover, these lawyers who, without theoretical
orientation, rummage around in economics or political science or labor
or city planning, run the danger of falling for the current plausible fad,
unaware of the controversy in the field surrounding it. The lawyer may
carry on the fad after the experts in the field have long abandoned it.
Sometimes the lawyer takes an attitude designed to prevent such ensnare-
ment: "It is all bunk. You can find experts on any side of a question;
why look into it deeply? Nobody knows anything."
These are the dangers in the prevailing shy advances toward social
science integration. There are dangers likewise in the traditional case-
limited teaching, and this, too, sometimes produces a devastating con-
tempt for the work of other social scientists. Moreover, the assumed
incompetence of lawyers to act as responsible individuals is largely a
convenient fiction; no one can be judgment-proof. The only solution,
then, is to go forward towards the development of a conscious and
sophisticated judgment based on the type of thoroughgoing work Pro-
fessors Michael and Wechsler have exhibited in their chosen field. We
must realize in the meantime, however, that failure on our part to take
sides on social problems does not always rest on a venial ignorance of
social data, or on the naive optimism that in the struggle of opposing
counsel the issues will be clearly stated and the right will triumph. "Facts"
never determine values. And so we cannot wait for the last word in
social science before taking a position; such waiting often really springs
from timidity or cynicism or the hypocrisy of "objectivity" -and these
are not venial. For they leave a vacuum of good leadership in the com-
munity, and if daring and democratic leadership is not provided from
within the educational system, destructive anti-democratic leadership is
amply provided from without. It is the peculiarity of democratic teach-
ing that while it presents positions candidly, it also asks for criticisms.
A student may read the Michael and Wechsler chapter on Civil Liberties
and conclude that they are a bad thing, that Sacco and Vanzetti were
properly electrocuted, and that the maxim nulla poena sine lege is deca-
dent or overcautious. But he cannot read the chapter carefully without
knowing that the authors disagree with him and without having to con-
sider as a problem what he may previously have unreflectingly assumed.
Naivete and cynicism are the characteristic reactions of today's adoles-
cents, and the law students who succumb to them in turn repeat the legal
phylogeny that runs from the simple symmetries of analytical jurispru-
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dence to the revolt from an emaciated logic of Freudian, Marxian, and
mixed-breed determinists. Naivete unfits lawyers as practitioners; cyni-
cism unfits them as democratic citizens. Michael and WVechsler are not
only informed and critical; they are also ethically vigorous and mature.
Their book is proof that the progressive elements in sociological juris-
prudence and in legal realism have finally overcome the period of growing
pains and can pass free and adult among men. As its pattern becomes
a model for the organization of equally inclusive materials around simi-
larly vital problems of social control, we may expect a major shift in
teaching, and, consequently, an improvement in the character and com-
petence of the bar.
